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ABSTRACT 
Large cuts in defense spending cause serious repercussions throughout the American economy. 
One means to counter the negative effects of defense reductions is to redirect federal dollars to 
temporarily prop up defense industries and, over the longer-term, stimulate growth of new non- 
defense industries. The creation of non-defense products and industries by channeling ideas from 
public laboratories into the private sector manufacturing facilities, known as technology transfer, 
is being undertaken in a massive program that has high visibility, large amounts of money, and 
broad federal agency involvement. How effectively federal money can be directed toward 
stimulating the creation of non-defense products will define the strength of the economy, (i.e., tax 
base, employment level, trade balance, capital investments, etc.), over the next decade. Key 
fbnctions of the tech transfer process are technology and market assessment, capital formation, 
manufacturing feasibility, sales and distribution, and business organization creation. Those, 
however, are not functions typically associated with the federal government. Is the government 
prepared to provide leadership in those areas? This paper suggests organic systems theory as a 
means to structure the public sector's actions to provide leadership in functional areas normally 
outside their scope of expertise, By applying new ideas in organization theory, can we design 
government action to efficiently and effectively transfer technologies? 
INTRODUCTION 
Technology transfer is expected to revitalize the economy. At the federal level we have dedicated 
sizable programs and 1040% of the federal research and development (R&D) budget to that 
effort. The question I wish to raise is whether we have structured our organizations to 
accomplish that goal? Or, will we diminish our outcomes because we have not given close 
attention to the organizational structures to facilitate technology transfer? This paper will make 
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observations about technology transfer processes and suggest that organic systems theory will 
help us organize ourselves to succeed. 
PERSPECTIVES ON TWE ISSUE OF SYSTEMS THEORY AND TECH TRANSFER 
This segment of the Dual Use Technology Conference is designed to investigate, "Technologies 
for Technology Transfer," and this particular session is "Business Processes and Technology 
Transfer." My comments are based on the premise that our most valuable technology is our pool 
of human resources. How those resources, the people involved, are directed is unquestionably a 
matter of management, and management is changing. Effective management is no longer 
considered to be quantification-centered. Nor is it based on endless planning and forecasting. 
After decades of measuring everything, we have learned that our world is complex, forecasts are 
usually wrong, and detailed plans are nearly worthless nine months after they are completed. Far 
too many managers find it safer to demand "quantified certainty" than to make operational 
decisions. After all, if the numbers add up, the manager can't be faulted even if there is a bad 
outcome. And, if the bad outcome is proved to be unforeseen, then the manager is innocent -- or 
so goes traditional thinking. In fact, managers are guilty of wasting time, money, and perhaps 
worst of all, they work in organizations where it takes great courage to make decisions. The 
results of the traditional management approach are well known: disappointing productivity, 
difficulty in meeting foreign competition, and a shrinking manufacturing base. 
However, progressive organizations have begun to retreat from the traditional ME3A -- 
quantitative -- methods. What must evolve in order to fill that vacuum is a revised paradigm 
based on experience and research. Organic systems theory may be the answer. It builds on a 
substantial body of knowledge about systems, yet is updated to correct the faults of the traditional 
machine systems theory. We now understand that we are not simple cogs in a machine system, 
rather we are like complex cells or organs in a large dynamic organism, subject to all types of 
external and internal stimuli. Although there is a level of predictability to our functions, it is by no 
means certain. 
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THE ESSENCE OF THE ALTERNATIVE 
Peter Senge has written an important book on this transformation in management thought, me 
Fvth Discipline: B e  Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. Senge proposes that 
organizations have the capability to unlock enormous potential in creativity if they can observe the 
whole system in which the organization operates. He writes: 
The essence of the discipline of systems thinking lies in a shift' of mind: seeing 
interrelationships rather than linear cause-effect chains, and seeing processes of change 
rather than snapshots (Senge, p.73) 
He goes on to explain, 
Systems thinking finds its greatest benefits in helping us distinguish high- from low- 
leverage changes in highly complex situations. In effect, the art of systems thinking lies in 
seeing trough complexity to the underlying structures generating change. . . . .What we 
most need are ways to know what is important and what is not important, what variables 
to focus on and which to pay less attention to -- and we need ways to do this which can 
help groups or teams develop shared understanding. (Senge, p. 128) 
Shared understanding is precisely what is troubling about the sudden emphasis on technology 
transfer for many government agencies and workers. Do they have a shared understanding? 
Buckminister Fuller spoke of our ideas being two hundred years ahead of our social development. 
What he meant by that was that we have the capability to do more than we do. What impedes our 
progress is that humans avoid change and this is clearly built into our species. It is as much 
genetic as it is cultural. Unlike other animals, we spend years with our dependent offspring before 
they go out into the world on their own. That in itself is a major contributor to a pattern that 
slows social and cultural change in organizations. 
When we institute a major change in the way a large organization like a federal agency operates 
we must account for these patterns of human behavior that s e c t  the process of change. Organic 
systems theory can help us create mechanisms within the organization that ameliorate the negative 
aspects of resistance to change and speed the assimilation of new ideas. This technology for 
technology transfer is a methodology for thinking about the task in terms of the organization and 
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its members. The important search is for appropriate structures and processes within the 
organization that will lead to fulfillment of our goals. 
ISSUES INTERNAL TO THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROCESS 
There are four major internal problem areas facing the technology transfer process that I believe 
can be successfully addressed through organizational and process change: 
1. PERSONNEL: Federal lab staff and scientists, to date, are not thoroughly committed 
to tech transfer tasks of commercialization. There is not wide-spread experience with or a 
commitment to technology identification and assessment for commercialization, CRADA 
development, and solicitation of industry support for transfer of technologies. 
2. CONTACTS AND ACCESS: Relatively few commercial enterprises are "plugged- 
in" to federal labs to the degree that they can efficiently gain access to available ideas, or 
work through the process of development. 
3. CAPITAL: Capital is not available in the quantity necessary for most small firms to 
sustain the technology identification, assessment, and R&D process to bring an idea out of 
a federal lab. 
4. BUSINESS EXPERTISE IN LABS: Federal agencies do not have sufficient 
expertise in manufacturing and market assessment, finance, or sales and distribution to 
assist commercial firms with those functions. Consequently, it is hard to advise or know 
what is commercializable. 
Leadership in the technology transfer process whether it be agency-level or from Congress can 
define the organization and process of tech transfer to eliminate these areas of weakness. 
SYSTEMS THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 
What can be done? First, it is clear that public policies will determine the nature of the technology 
transfer initiative. The task we face is to enact policies that will maximize the effectiveness of the 
transfers. It is imperative that we look at the whole environment if we are to successhlly employ 
systems theory to this issue, For example, the technology transfer program within the Department 
of Defense @OD) and NASA is part of the larger policy outline framed by the broad national 
objectives of: 
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1) protecting our national research capabilities, 
2) preserving the industrial capabilities of our defense contractors, 
3) stimulating growth in the manufacturing sector to create jobs to off-set lost 
defense/federal jobs, 
4) regaining national competitiveness in the global marketplace to help correct a serious 
trade imbalance, and 
4) stimulating the economy to create additional revenues from tax receipts to reduce the 
federal budget deficit. 
Second, those objectives cannot be met through a single program within one agency. On the 
other hand, they can be met by a systemic approach that includes coordinated programs within a 
variety of agencies and with modifications to existing legislation that runs counter to national 
objectives. For example, the Technology Reinvestment Project is an undertaking coming from the 
Defense Conversion, Reinvestment, and Transition Assistance Act of 1992. The solicitation for 
proposals came from the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) representing five different 
agencies @OD, Commerce, DOE, NSF, and NASA). This is a good example of a coordinated 
effort among five agencies, leading directly to the transfer of technologies, However, are policy- 
makers developing other coordinated programs that address the other national objectives and tie 
together the related activities across the government? In the macro-view, have Congress and the 
Administration clarified their policies so that other critical agencies are operating in supportive 
roles? Is the Internal Revenue Service involved? Have tax laws been changed to place emphasis 
on capital investment in plant and equipment? Do capital gains taxes encourage investment? 
What will the Department of Labor's role be in direct support of the tech transfer initiative. Have 
the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve made policies that will fkee capital through 
instruments of debt? 
Similarly, in the micro-view, we can address the four internal problem areas mentioned above; 1) 
personnel, 2) contacts and access, 3) capital, and 4) business expertise in the labs. Beginning 
with personnel, have position descriptions and mission statements been rewritten to reflect the 
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changed objectives of the organization? The incentives built into the Technology Transfer Act of 
1986 provide for personal remuneration from lab activities but do not effect everyone involved in 
the process. Although such policies have generated change, it is a lengthy process and requires 
commitment from leadership and ongoing reinforcement in personnel policies; promotion 
decisions, award programs, and, if necessary, penalties for those who do not accept the changing 
mission of their agency. 
Are contacts fostered by public programs? Is access truly encouraged? Not long ago I attended a 
multi-day event put on by one of the military services to help introduce business to the availability 
of technology and to encourage cooperation between the federally sponsored research and the 
manufacturing community. Immediately following a warm welcoming appeal to the audience by 
the General Officer in command of the laboratory he was whisked away to other "important" 
business. He was followed by a civilian presenter from the contracting office who made it very 
clear that no matter who you were or what technology you wanted, if you didn't have "his" forms 
filled out properly, there was no way you would be awarded a contract. 
The message we in the audience understood was that in the next two days we would hear only 
more baloney, and oniy those insiders with experience in the system would be able to weed 
through the bureaucracy. Can such a break-down be fixed? Certainly, but it takes time and 
considerable effort. Obviously the contracting officer hadn't gotten the message and, one can only 
wonder whether the commander was sincere in his invitation to work with them, since he only 
attended the program long enough to hear himself 
Although capital availability is primarily driven by tax law and Federal Reserve Policy, in this 
context, through programs such as the Technology Reinvestment Project and the Small Business 
Innovation and Research (SBIR) Program, small amounts of capital are controlled at the agency- 
level. Within those Departments of government, do we have the best possible structure and 
system in place to direct tech transfer money? Are the evaluation and award processes most 
effective at transferring technologies or are SBIR funds, for instance, used as an "off budget" 
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means of pursuing insiders' pet projects? Is it necessary for this process to be administered in 
house? Are the awards objectively made when lab personnel provide the evaluation and make the 
awards? Or, would the process be better if an outside, rotating, panel of scientists and business 
persons was formed to review and recommend awards for approval by a top agency administrator 
who would be publicly accountable? Is it possible to build a checks and balances protection into 
the system that awards millions of dollars rather than keeping the process in the hands of the same 
people who have interests in certain technologies, personal ties to "insiders" and little 
accountability for long-term outcomes once the grants are awarded? 
CONCLUSION 
Public policy that directs technology transfer efforts throughout the federal laboratory system 
could benefit from the application of systems theory. The weaknesses in the present structure 
described above are not serious flaws as organizations go. But without correction, the potential 
exists for technology transfer efforts to be undermined from within and to remain of limited 
benefit to potential inventors, manufacturers, and investors who are positioned to make a 
difference in the American economy in the coming decade. I propose that leaders in this 
Administration and in Congress evaluate the current technology transfer process and question its 
validity from a systems theory perspective. Further, those at every level in the system can do 
likewise. I am confident that improvements can be made and that the pay-off will be significant. 
Research for this presentation uncovered titles that may provide a warning. (For example, "Let's 
Improve Technology Transfer," "Perry to Ruffle Feathers to Preserve Defense Industrial Base," 
"NASA's Controversial Quest for a Broader Mission," and, "Is Technology Transfer a Flop?") 
However, what we do with the enormous potential we have available from the outstanding work 
of the scientists in the federal laboratories will make a significant difference in the way we live and 
in the way our children fit into the shrinking world of the twenty-first century. We should take 
advantage of the technologies we have at our disposal -- aZZ the "technologies," including 
organization theory. Let us use organic systems theory as we formulate our public policies to 
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plan organizations that can unlock the creativity &d potential of our human resources. We have 
much to gain. 
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